Overview of the Battle of the Bulge

The Battle of the Bulge began with the German attack (Operation Wacht am Rhein and the Herbstnebel plan) at 5:00 a.m. on the morning of December 16, 1944 along an 85 mile front extending north from Echternach, Luxembourg to the historic town of Moschau, Germany. Some 250,000 Germans and almost 1,000 tanks and assault guns attacked the 75,000 Americans defending the front. Two later attacks on New Year's Day 1945 attempted to create second fronts in Holland (Operation Schneeman) and in northern France (Operation Nordwind).

Note: Since all the mentions of this army and that army can become confusing, German units are given in italics, and American units are in normal type.

The overall German plan is laid out in the map above (from Hugh Cole's official history "The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge", Map IX). In the original plan, three Armies (the Sixth Panzer Army, Fifth Panzer Army, and Seventh Army) would attack.

The Sixth Panzer Army, for political reasons, was given the official role of making the main effort and capturing Antwerp.
The Fifth Panzer Army was not designated as the main force in name, but it actually had the responsibility of hitting the center of the American lines, promptly capturing the highly strategic rail and road center of St. Vith, and driving on to capture Brussels.
The Seventh Army in the south was to peel off as it moved west and then turn and form a defensive line, in order to form a buffer area to prevent U.S. reinforcements from hitting the Fifth Panzer Army.
The Fifteenth Army "was not to be employed until the Allies had reacted in force to the German attack, and in any case could not be expected to launch a large-scale attack until the Allied front east of Aachen had been drastically denuded of troops." In fact, on December 13, 1944, the US 2nd Infantry Division began an attack in the Fifteenth Army area that further nullified any effect the Fifteenth Army might have in the attack.

With the exception of the critical road and rail center at St. Vith, the main towns were to be bypassed by the attacking panzer (armored) forces, so that the speed of the attack would not be slowed. Rear echelon infantry would clean out the bypassed towns. The military goal was to capture Antwerp and cut off the Allied troops to the north. The political goal was to cause division among the Allies and destroy the Allied coalition. The terrain was the dense Ardennes Forest. The weather was chilly mist and fog, so that Allied air support was nullified until December 23. (In fact, one of the German plans was named Herbstnebel or Autumn Mist.) In addition, ground visibility for the troops was often very low, due to the trees and fog. The dense forest had very few roads, none of which were large. Traffic jams on both sides of the front were a major problem for both Armies.

The only railroad on the entire front to cross from Germany into Belgium came to St. Vith, Belgium, making St. Vith, which was also a major road junction. Thus St. Vith was the most vital initial prize the Germans sought, in order to allow supplies to flow to support the remainder of the attack. It was no accident that St. Vith was right in the very center of the Fifth and Sixth Panzer Armies: St. Vith had to be the main line of supply for both Armies. The German plan called for capture of St. Vith by 1800 on December 17 by Fifth Panzer Army, but the defenders held at St. Vith until late on December 21. This led the German Fifth Panzer Army Commander, Gen. Hasso von Manteuffel, to recommend to Hitler's adjutant on December 24 that "the German Army give up the attack and return to the West Wall." Manteuffel's reason for this recommendation was "due to the time lost by his Fifth Panzer Army in the St. Vith area."

Hitler did not accept Manteuffel's recommendation, and the German supplies began to run out. German columns ran low on gas and ammunition well before reaching even their first major goal: the Meuse River. On December 23, the weather cleared, and Allied planes finally filled the skies in support of the besieged American troops. (Some of the GI's had wondered why they saw German planes before that, despite the conditions, but saw no American planes.) Slowly but surely the Allies -- from the North, the West, and the South -- closed the salient, the Bulge. The First US Army troops from the north met the Third US Army troops from the south at Houffalize, Belgium on January 16, 1945. St. Vith was recaptured on January 23, 1945. The ending date of the Bulge is considered as January 25, 1945, since this was the date on which the lost positions were officially thought to have been completely regained. In fact, as a series of letters in the VBOB "Bulge Bugle" have noted, some positions were not regained until after January 25, 1945.

In the largest battle ever fought by the U. S. Army, with 600,000 GI's involved, it is difficult to place one unit or location ahead of another in importance. But the reality is that two crucial stands at the front lines are what really doomed the German attack to certain failure:

1. Holding the Northern Shoulder: The 99th Infantry Division and the 291st Engineer Combat Battalion bore the brunt of the Sixth Panzer Army attack on Day 1, and they held most of their ground, creating what would become the northern shoulder. (Keep in mind that the southern shoulder was one that the Germans themselves intended to form with their Seventh Army -- which they pretty much succeeded in doing.)

2. Holding St. Vith: The 7th Armored Division and the 106th Infantry Division, with elements of the 9th Armored Division and 28th Infantry Division, held St. Vith four days beyond the German timetable. Even the German Fifth Panzer Army commander recognized that the attack was doomed as a result.
It is significant to note that the 7th Armored Division was near Aachen, Germany when the German attack began. The 7th Armored Division had to move 60-70 miles to the south on Day 2. If the 99th Infantry Division and 291st Engineer Combat Battalion had not held on the northern shoulder, the 7th Armored Division never would have reached St. Vith. Even when the 7th Armored Division had reached St. Vith, it was the troops on the northern shoulder and the newly arrived 82nd Airborne Division that kept a very narrow escape route open for the virtually surrounded defenders of St. Vith. But once the defense of St. Vith was set up, that defense also bolstered the defense of the northern shoulder, as both defenses forced the German columns off of their planned routes and led to considerable congestion as the German columns were then funneled in between the northern shoulder and the St. Vith salient.

But what about Bastogne? In popular thinking, the Battle of the Bulge is synonymous with the Battle of Bastogne. This is very unfortunate, since it ignores the real military keys (holding the northern shoulder and holding St. Vith) to the defeat of the Germans. Journalists hungry for some sign of American success at stopping the German onslaught played up the defense of Bastogne, where Gen. Anthony McAuliffe (101st Airborne Division) said "Nuts" to a German surrender demand and where the Third US Army (10th Armored Division) broke through the German Seventh Army's buffer to reach the surrounded town on Day 3 of the Battle of the Bulge. This was truly heroic stuff. But from a military strategy point of view (and this can easily be seen on the map above), while Bastogne was a strategically important major road junction for sustaining the attack, it was on the periphery of the attack and well behind the initial front lines. The German plan was to have the panzers bypass Bastogne and let the later echelons of infantry and artillery units clean it out. And the panzers did succeed in bypassing Bastogne, so that their plan in that sector was on schedule. As a source for rallying U. S. spirits, the defense of Bastogne and McAuliffe's "Nuts" were a success.

But from a strategic perspective, the German fate had already been sealed at St. Vith, when they could not take that critical supply center on Day 2 - nor on Days 3, 4, 5, and most of 6. Bastogne did not become surrounded by forces intent on taking it until the night of December 21, Day 6 of the Battle of the Bulge. And the famous "Nuts" did not come until December 22, Day 7. Heroic as the deeds of the defenders of Bastogne were, the defense of Bastogne is a very important secondary element but not one of the true strategic keys to the German failure.

BATTLE FACTS
· The coldest, snowiest weather “in memory” in the Ardennes Forest on the German/Belgium border.
· Over a million men, 500,000 Germans, 600,000 Americans (more than fought at Gettysburg) and 55,000 British.
· 3 German armies, 10 corps, the equivalent of 29 divisions.
· 3 American armies, 6 corps, the equivalent of 33 divisions.
· The equivalent of 3 British divisions as well as contingents of Belgian, Canadian and French troops.
· 100,000 German casualties, killed, wounded or captured.
· 81,000 American casualties, including 23,554 captured and 19,000 killed.
· 1,400 British casualties 200 killed.
· 800 tanks lost on each side, 1,000 German aircraft.
· The Malmedy Massacre, where 86 American soldiers were murdered, was the worst atrocity committed against American troops during the course of the war in Europe.
· In it's entirety, the “Battle of the Bulge,” was the worst battles- in terms of losses - to the American Forces in WWII.

Credits:

The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge by Hugh Cole

Time - Life Books

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